Introduction
In the late fourteenth century, China's Ming dynasty was annoyed by persistent raids by Japanese pirates along the Chinese coast. Successive emperors attempted to crack down on them but ultimately failed, as the pirates were too agile, remote, and hence elusive. In its search for an alternative countermeasure, the Ming dynasty, on several occasions, dispatched envoys to Japan's secular Muromachi shogunate. In exchange for a tributary status that actually brought enormous economic profits to the Japanese shogunate, China requested Japan to suppress the piracy. In response, Japan's shogunate arrested some pirate chieftains and submitted them to the Ming court (Tanaka 2012: 76) . Shortly after the so-called tally trade was initiated between the two countries, piratical activities waned substantially (Mote 1999: 720) . This is a practice of indirect policing that this article is wholly concerned with.
Instances of indirect policing can also be found in the contemporary period. The increasing consumption of illegal drugs has been a long-standing concern for the U.S. To curb the supply of drugs in an effective manner, the U.S. forged security partnerships with Colombia and Mexico, both of which were major roots and routes of narcotic trafficking (Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative). These partnerships aimed at assisting the governments of Colombia and Mexico financially and militarily in their campaigns against drug cartels.
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These two episodes suggest that even a superpower has to rely on a third party to wipe out transnational perpetrators if they are harbored beyond its reach. The very reason for its reliance is the third party's influence over transnational perpetrators. However, indirect policing is not always functional.
In its pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, the U.S. deployed combat drones in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Yemen, and Somalia, instead of relying on the sovereign authorities of these regions, to defeat al-Qaeda, Taliban, and their associates (Scahill 2013) .
Despite accumulating collateral damages and accompanying protests from the local populace, the U.S. has still been fixated on the drone tactics there. 2 In contrast with the indirect form, we call this direct policing, whereby the targeted or victimized state itself conducts security campaigns against perpetrators.
cripple adversaries, while deterrence is a form of coercion that aims to threaten them (Table 1) . When indirect policing is adopted, Defender (e.g., Ming China in the lead episode) may not observe whether Proxy (Muromachi Japan) actually adopts preemption or deterrence. Defender may not care about the means of policing but merely about the consequence. Thus, what is practiced indirectly is not necessarily deterrence but possibly preemption. However, the literature on indirect deterrence seems unconscious of the distinction between them. Moreover, what we have observed across the Third World, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, since the 9/11 attacks imply failures of deterrence-the military has been engaged and violence exchanged for so long (Kroenig and Pavel 2012: 24) . Although indirect policing is far from rare, it remains surprisingly understudied. For these reasons, we espouse "policing"
rather than "deterrence" to express what we address throughout the article.
Given the prevalence of policing against transnational perpetrators, we categorize policing into four forms, associating each with historical and contemporary incidents. Policing is called: (i) direct if it is conducted solely by Defender (e.g., U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, Operation
Neptune Spear, Somali counter-piracy); (ii) indirect if it is solely by Proxy (e.g., U.S. War on Drugs in
Colombia and Mexico, Operation Enduring Freedom -Philippines); (iii) joint if it is by both Defender and Proxy (e.g., Operation Inherent Resolve; Israel-Palestine relations after the Second Intifada, medieval China-Japan alliance against Japanese pirates); and (iv) reciprocal if it is divisibly and multilaterally fulfilled by several Defender-Proxy states (e.g., Interpol, Five Eyes, Budapest Convention, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, U.S. Fugitive Slave Laws). We then deliver the conditions under which different forms of policing are adopted.
Our work's contribution to the literature can be summarized in threefold.
First, while existing analyses of indirect deterrence and the like lack formal rational-choice grounds (Atzili and Pearlman 2012; Bar 2008; Carter 2012; Colby 2008; Jenkins 2002, 2004; George 2002; Heymann 2001/02; Knopf 2008 Knopf , 2012 Smelser and Mitchell 2002; Trager and Zagorcheva 2005/06; Whiteneck 2005; Wilner 2011 ), we develop a game-theoretic model to depict the strategic interaction among Defender, Proxy, and Perpetrators. In doing so, we exploit theories of deterrence, repeated games, and principal agent.
Second, unlike the literature on indirect deterrence, we study situations where Defender may combine preemption with deterrence. We believe that our theory better captures the situation where a government fails to deter some Perpetrators and is forced to fight them (e.g., U.S. War on Terrorism). Notable theoretical work on preemption and deterrence is Sandler and Siqueira (2006) , who emphasize substitutive aspects of preemption and deterrence. In contrast, we treat them as complementary countermeasures (Table 1) .
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Third, our analyses pertain not just to indirect policing, but also to three other forms. Instead of appraising indirect policing unconditionally, we seek to explore its disadvantages as well as advantages to explain why Defender sometimes adopts direct policing (e.g., U.S. drones strikes against terrorists) rather than indirect counterpart. By delivering the condition for each of these forms, we address why one of them appears better than others in a given situation.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. After presenting an informal theory on deterrence against perpetrators, we develop a game-theoretic model that formulates the four forms of transnational policing.
We then elucidate the advantages and disadvantages of each policing form and subsequently offer incidents of policing. In conclusion, we summarize our theoretical findings. 
Theory of Deterrence against Perpetrators
Before introducing the formal model, we informally theorize deterrence against perpetrators, based upon classical deterrence theory and its criticisms (Bowen 2004: 59; Harvey 1998; Lebow 1981: 85-89; Levy 1988: 486; Wilner 2011: 31) . We maintain that deterrence against perpetrators (such as crackers, pirates, and terrorist networks) comprises the following three tasks: (Bowen 2004: 68; Gray 2003, 453; Levy 1988; Wilner 2011: 31) .
 Capability. Defender has the means to inflict unbearable damages on Attacker.
Moreover, for Defender to implement the three tasks above, three qualifications for Perpetrators as deterrees are also needed, as listed below:
 Unity. Perpetrators are well-centralized and organized that they can make and carry through a collective decision as if they were a unitary actor. Otherwise, even when their leadership is deterred, their peripheral elements may not be (Miller 2013; Sageman 2004: 167, 172-173; Sageman 2008 ).
 Visibility. Perpetrators retain a certain degree of transparency in that if aggression takes place, Perpetrators can be identified with sufficient likelihood, and their return addresses detected.
 Return address. Perpetrators have a sizable and damageable value to hold dear.
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The discussion above is a modification of classical deterrence theory that overlooks the necessity of 8 Some perpetrators are so fanatical that they have no or little secular value to hold dear (Betts 2002; Knopf 2008: 229; Trager and Zagorcheva 2005/05: 87; Wilner 2011: 4). intelligence as the deterrer's qualification as well as unity, visibility, and return address as the deterree's qualifications (Bowen 2004: 59; Harvey 1998; Lebow 1981: 85-89; Levy 1988: 486; Wilner 2011: 31) . This is presumably because the targets of U.S. deterrence during the Cold-War era were almost exclusively overt adversaries-the Soviet Union and its allies-which trivially met these qualifications.
However, these qualifications have attracted attention in recent decades, because scholars and policymakers have shifted their attention from the Cold-War adversaries to more diverse threats, whose novel characteristics have nullified traditional deterrence tactics. If some of these qualifications are not met, deterrence would be difficult, and preemption could be a realistic option, as Defender resorts to forestallment instead of punishment (Table 1 ). 
The Model
To figure out the factors that shape the form of policing, we develop a game-theoretic model that depicts a strategic situation, where Defender seeks to police potential Perpetrators ∈ [0, ] aiming to attack from abroad.
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Off-Shore Policing
To contain any Perpetrator , Defender may adopt preemptive and/or deterrent measures. By virtue of her intelligence agency, can identify and find out each before (after) he commits perpetration with probability ∈ (0,1) ( ∈ (0,1)). 10 That means, can ward off 's attack preemptively with probability , and once she is attacked, can punish the attacker with probability .
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For both preemption and punishment, spends a per-case cost > 0, which is associated with mobilizing and dispatching her armed forces to 's sanctuary.
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Each Perpetrator decides (not) to attack Defender .
2. Before perpetration takes place, decides (not) to forestall those identified who decided to attack in 1.
3. After perpetration, decides (not) to punish those identified who actually attacked .
The flow of 's perpetration when adopts policing (which combines preemption and deterrence) 9 denotes 's population. 10 Though unnecessary, it is natural that < . It is presmably more difficult to identify a Perpetrator before an incident occurs than after. 11 Practically, an intelligence agency can make wrongful charges (i.e., misjudging an innocent party as a perpetrator), but such a problem is abstracted away from our model as it is beyond our concern.
( ) 
where , , and are 's expected payoffs from preemption, deterrence, and policing, respectively. Apparently, 's choice hinges on the accuracy of identification ( and ), the relative sizes of cost and damage on ( and ), the size of the threats to ( ), and 's decision calculus (F( ) and ). Among the four alternatives, adopts preemption whenever possible ( > and > ), because preemption is preferred to being attacked ( < ).
In contrast to preemption, deterrence may not emerge immediately, because unlike preemption, a punishment itself brings no direct benefit to Defender-she has already been attacked anyway. In this sense, Defender may lack what justifies the cost of punishment, generating the commitment problem-it 12 In Figure 1 , indicates "nature" which determines whether is identified or not. If only preemption (deterrence) is adopted, = 0 ( = 0).
13 To purify the effects of preemption and deterrence, we assume that preemption inflicts no cost on (generating no deterrent effect). If incurs the cost from preemption, a larger fraction � ( / ̅ + ) of would be deterred. 14 By < , prefers her own preemption to 's perpetration.
is often difficult for Defender to credibly convince potential Perpetrators of future retaliation (Bowen 2004: 59; Harvey 1998; Lebow 1981: 85-89; Levy 1988: 486; Wilner 2011: 31) . This problem is plausible because 's decision to punish is made only after the perpetration takes place.
In our model, the commitment problem can be resolved in a long-term context, where the game above is played repeatedly in successive time periods = 1,2,3, ⋯.
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To deter future perpetration, Defender must demonstrate her commitment by punishing the identified Perpetrators in every period. The success in deterrence thus necessitates her will and capability of producing such a demonstration effect, by which
Perpetrators are informed and afraid of punishments caused by their deeds.
Put formally, the condition for credible punishments in the repeated game is:
where ∈ (0,1) is 's discount factor for her future payoffs. By Condition (1), the cost of punishing the identified Perpetrators today (in the left-hand side, henceforth LHS) must not be so large as the present value of future deterrence (in the right-hand side, RHS).
In sum, off-shore direct policing emerges as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)-that we employ as the game's solution-with Condition (1): (1), because its LHS is positive. In addition, Condition (1) suffices that has the incentive to maintain her policing. Therefore, off-shore policing forms an equilibrium if Condition (1) holds. Condition (1) is necessary for the equilibrium as well.
By Condition (1), policing gives the largest expected payoff among the four alternatives, but this game has multiple equilibria as with other repeated games. 16 This multiplicity implies that off-shore 15 A possible interpretation of this repeated game is that Perpetrators newly emerge every period. 16 Another (pure-strategy) equilibrium is mere preemption that takes place if any does not believe 's punishments.
policing casts doubt on the credibility of punishment for deterrence. The commitment problem emerges because Defender must dispatch her armed forces at the ex post cost in an ad hoc manner. One of the approaches to alleviating the problem is to reduce or eliminate . On-shore policing, which we introduce next, is one of such approaches.
On-Shore Policing
With on-shore policing, Defender stations her armed forces in the region, where Perpetrators hide themselves, in preparation for possible attacks. In doing so, can demonstrate her resolve for policing by evading the ex post per-case cost and instead by sinking an ex ante lump-cost > 0 (Fearon 1997) . 17 That means, at the beginning of the game, which will no longer be repeated, can commit herself to policing by paying the cost associated with stationing her armed forces near 's sanctuary.
From on-shore policing, expects her payoff to be:
On-shore policing forms an SPNE if it brings a larger expected payoff than off-shore policing:
Proposition 2: In comparison between on-and off-shore policing, adopts the former if the lump-sum
cost of on-shore policing is so small that > , or
Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is immediate from the comparison between and . Note that Condition (2) is sufficient but not necessary-even when on-shore policing is adopted, it can still be that > due to the commitment problem associated with off-shore policing (Condition (1)).
Condition (2) suggests that the relative advantage of on-shore policing depends on the size � � �� + ̅ � of Perpetrators to police as well as the relative size between and .
On-shore policing makes more sense if the threats to counteract are greater.
In what follows, we will use on-shore policing as a benchmark for comparison across various forms of policing by assuming that on-shore policing is superior to any off-shore alternatives (i.e., > max { , , ,
17 An empirical study suggests that the success of deterrence hinges on the immediacy of counteraction against states (Huth and Russett 1988) .
Indirect Policing
Defender may face economic, ethical, legal, physical, and political constraints that hinder her policing, especially preemption, abroad. In light of such constraints, Defender may use the state of Perpetrators' sanctuary, instead of herself, to police Perpetrators, if such Proxy-labelled as -s better at policing them. This indirect policing can be induced positively (i.e., through reward).
To induce positively, compensates for the cost of policing > 0, and 's expected payoff is:
where a subscript ∈ { , } is added to parameters to indicate the associated player-there polices at cost paid by . (For simplicity, it is assumed that 's policing behavior and the associated cost are both observable to . 18 ) Then, adopts indirect policing instead of direct policing if > :
Proposition 3: Indirect policing outperforms (on-shore) direct policing if it is so efficient (with a small
) and effective (with large , , and ) that
Proof: The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 are immediate from comparing payoffs at stake. For both propositions, has the incentive for policing, because 's cost of policing is covered by , so that 's payoff remains zero. Note that Condition (3) is sufficient but not necessary because of the possibility that = .
Condition (3) compares the relative cost (in the LHS) and effectiveness (in the RHS) of 's policing, implying that indirect policing can work if can police more efficiently and effectively than . The advantages of in policing may lie in her intelligence ( > and > ) as well as the cost ( < ) and severity ( > ) of punishments.
Joint Policing
If Defender and Proxy counteract Perpetrators cooperatively, more effective policing might be expected. We call such a form of policing joint policing, from which 's expected payoff is: 
As Condition (4) suggests, joint policing is likely to be superior to either direct or indirect policing if (i) it exhibits the economies of scale ( , < min { , }), (ii) joint punishments are effective ( , > max { , } ), and (iii) and have different pieces of information ( , > max { , } ;
, > max { , }). In the repeated game, the conditions for reciprocity can be delineated as:
Reciprocal Policing
where is the discount factor of both and ; is 's expected payoff from on-shore policing of ( ≡ − − ̅ � � ̅ ); and for ∈ { , } is 's expected payoffs from reciprocal policing:
In regard to Condition (5), for instance, if shirks policing , will not police , so that must directly police on her own (with her payoff ). By Conditions (5) and (6), the two states protect each other to garner each other's protection. Conditions (5) and (6) also suggest that because reciprocal policing requires states to have long-term interests, it would be difficult if the states' administrations were politically unstable. 
Advantages and Disadvantages
The critical difference among the four forms of policing lies in the allocation of the tasks for policing (i.e., threatening, investigation, and punishment for deterrence; investigation and forestallment for preemption) between Defender and Proxy. The allocation determines the advantages and disadvantages of each of the four forms, which we elucidate below in line with our formal analyses.
Direct Policing
Policing of Perpetrators is often difficult for Defender, because they have novel characteristics that hamper Defender's tasks for policing. Perpetrators' characteristics potentially obstructive to policing are listed as follows:
 Agility. Perpetrators who can move and rove in an agile way may not be easily detected and grasped.
Agility also raises the cost of punishment by expanding the risk of collateral damages (as with hellfire missiles launched from combat drones flying in Pakistan).
 Easiness of perpetration. As the cost of perpetration falls, it can become more escalated. In extreme situations, it is committed without deliberation (e.g., a cracker's tapping of F5 for Denial-of-Service attacks). Perpetrators' unified will. Without it, some members of Perpetrators' group may act against the will of their leadership. Some terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, appeared to lack the system (Sageman 2008: 146) .
 Lack of representative. A representative is needed for both external and internal relations. Externally, he is to receive the threat of punishment hurled by Defender. Internally, he may assume leadership in a group to integrate its members' opinions and make a collective decision.
The effects of these characteristics on the tasks for policing are summarized in Table 2 . 23 These obstacles tend to make Defender's investigation inaccurate (with small and ), forestallment and punishment costly and ineffective (with large and small ), exacerbating the commitment problem especially when Defender seeks to deter Perpetrators off the shore (Proposition 1).
Note that the effects of these characteristics on policing are determined not solely by Perpetrators per se but also by their relations to Defender. That means, these effects can be weakened if policing is delegated 21 Even fanatical terrorists may have return addresses (Steinberg 2001) . 22 Even the most elusive terrorists require permissive state environments (Gray 2003: 453) . A state may also passively sponsor terrorism (Byman 2005) . 23 Because we build our theory on rational-choice grounds, we intentionally put aside Perpetrators' irrationality, which is apparently another causal factor of deterrence failure. (Imagine drug-addicted rebel leaders in the Sierra Leone Civil War during the 1990s). Irrationality undermines deliberate decision-making and accurate communication.
to another party. On these grounds, indirect policing has a potential to effectively police elusive Perpetrators when they are deemed not directly policeable.
Indirect Policing (Advantages)
In light of Perpetrators' obstructive characteristics, Defender can hardly fulfill the tasks for policing. It then makes sense for Defender to rely on a third party (Proxy) who is in a better position to influence
Perpetrators. This is when indirect policing appears as a serious choice. Although the literature finds the merit of indirect deterrence in the third party's influence, the sources of the influence have not been explored in a systematic manner. 24 We offer a functional account of why Proxy can be more influential on Perpetrators than Defender and more fundamentally why indirect policing can outperform direct policing.
Below we explore the sources of Proxy's influence that are closely associated with the tasks for policing.
Proxy as a Liaison: Communicative Advantage
Proxy has the advantage in communicating with Perpetrators, which can be explained twofold. The first argument concerns the credibility of threats. (Buzzard 1956; Freedman 2004: 35; Nitze 1956 ). Even when deterrence fails at an early stage, Proxy can still retain options of more severe punishments to deter the escalation of perpetration. On the contrary, Defender must face difficulties with imposing punishments because of the physical distance. A punishment farther away from its target takes more cost and time. Off-shore deterrence is known to be much less effective, because the cost of mobilizing forces casts doubt on the credibility of threats and also because delayed punishments are not so threatening for impatient or present-minded deterrees.
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Indirect Policing (Disadvantages)
The disadvantages of indirect policing stem from Defender's delegation of policing to Proxy.
Inefficiency may occur at least in two scenarios if Defender has limited information about Proxy. In one,
Defender cannot observe Proxy's choice. In the other, Defender does not know Proxy's cost of policing.
Both scenarios result in overcompensation-Defender ends up paying more than the true cost of policing.
Below we informally outline the problems. Defender's ample aid to Proxy, as caused by the informational problems above, may merely corrupt government. 29 While the immediate or short-term balance of forces favors the defender, the long-term balance of forces does not (Huth and Russett 1988 to wipe out his political enemies brutally. 32 Both corruption and tyranny could provoke hostile reactions from citizens. If Proxy continues to abuse his power for his own ends, his populace may become discontented and even question his legitimacy. As Proxy's administration loses civilian support, it could be replaced by an anti-Defender junta, ideologist party, or extremist organization, resulting in Defender's loss of influence there. In fact, the U.S. experienced the downfall of its sympathizer administrations and the rise of its challengers in the third world-Iraq, Cuba, Libya, South Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, Egypt, and Somalia, all of which once adopted more or less pro-U.S. policies.
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Joint Policing
Because joint policing is conducted by both Defender and Proxy instead of just one or the other, it can be more effective than either direct or indirect policing. Put concretely, Defender and Proxy together can find out Perpetrators more accurately ( , > max { , } and , > max { , }) and punish them more severely ( , > max { , } for punishment). In addition, joint policing can also achieve more efficiency (i.e., , < min { , }), because specialization can occur between them. To suppress the insurgency by ISIL, for instance, the U.S. has focused its resources mainly on satellite surveillance and air raids, while Iraq has advanced its troops on the ground. Because the U.S. and Iraq face different sorts of constraints, they naturally seek and adopt different tactics. To eradicate the Japanese piracy, in another instance, China and Japan implicitly divided the tasks geographically. While the Chinese Ming court banished the pirates roving the Chinese coast, the Japanese shogunate quashed their home strongholds (Tanaka 2012: 76-77) . The division of tasks in these instances had a potential to reduce the cost of policing.
Despite these advantages, joint policing is not always an option for Defender. The collaboration may not 31 According to the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, weapons and ammunition supplied by the U.S. to the Somali government were sold for cash and ultimately fell into the hands of the terrorist organization, al Shabab (Scahill 2013: 476) . 32 Abuses of human rights were reported in the operations of Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative (Olson and Wilson 2010) . One might also consider Operation Condor of the 1970s, in which right-wing juntas aimed to eradicate communists in several South-American states. 33 It is apparently too hasty to attribute these regime changes solely to U.S. intervention, but at the same time, it is probably too naïve to deny the U.S. influence in these regions.
produce the synergy effects mentioned above if policing by either Defender or Proxy is severely constrained by some of economic, ethical, geographic, legal, political, or technological obstacles (Table   2) .
Reciprocal Policing
Reciprocal policing formulates a collective security regime that can be mutually beneficial for the participating states. Because each state can focus on policing Perpetrators within its domain, this regime tends to enhance efficiency ( < for ; < for ) as well as effectiveness ( > , > , and > for ; > , > , and > for ). In addition, because policing is induced negatively (i.e., with a threat of penalty), no financial transfer is required.
Consequently, the inefficiency associated with the private information in delegation (i.e., overcompensation) does not emerge in reciprocal policing. Instead, it may suffer the so-called free-rider problem-the incentive for policing may be impaired especially when many states take part in the regime.
For instance, despite having a red notice from Interpol, Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherd has not been detained for years but has appeared to the media and to the public, suggesting Interpol's inability to work in accordance with its member state's laws. 34 The free-rider problem also arises from the lack of a monitoring mechanism. In fact, the unverifiability of compliance is exactly the reason that the U.S. has been a consistent opponent of arms control in cyberspace (Clarke and Knake 2010: 219) . 35 As with Five
Eyes, a selective membership may alleviate this problem.
34 Paul Watson even overtly attended the Cannes Film Festival in 2015. 35 Arms control in cyberspace includes the prevention of cybercrimes. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union agreed to a multilateral ban on biological weapons, but then secretly went on to create a massive biological weapons arsenal that the U.S. did not detect (Clarke and Knake 2010: 222) . 
Incidents
We have categorized the practices of transnational policing into four forms (Figure 2 ). We delineate them using associated historical and contemporary incidents.
Direct Policing
If there is no reliable candidate for Proxy, Defender has no other option than policing Perpetrators on her own, or she must tolerate them. The U.S. drone strikes against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorist groups in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Yemen, and Somalia since 2002 largely fall in this category (Scahill 2013: 78) . So does the command targeting Osama bin Laden (Operation Neptune Spear). We group these instances of policing solely by Defender into what we call direct policing.
Defender may police Perpetrators from her home (off-shore policing) or from their vicinities (on-shore policing), but other things being equal, off-shore policing will have more difficulties with producing and demonstrating her commitment to policing (Proposition 1), as implied by the lack or rarity of effective counter-perpetration measures by the U.S. until the 9/11 attacks (Bowen 2004 attacks (Miller and Wines 2002) . The lead episode about China and the Japanese pirates in the medieval era also illustrates a feature of joint policing. While China's Ming government repeatedly requested Japan's shogunate to control the pirates, China itself fought and effectively defeated them in 1419, after which Japanese piratical activities declined drastically (Tanaka 2012: 77) .
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Note that the three forms of policing listed above are conceptually distinctive, but their boundaries are practically ambiguous. Defender often controls the degree of her direct involvement, depending on how effectively Proxy can police Perpetrators. In its pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, the U.S. has deliberately chosen the extent of its own military engagements, based on the power of the local authorities and the severity of the insurgency. Its engagement is intensive in Yemen and Somalia-as exemplified by the deployment of combat drones-but very moderate in the Philippines-where it is restricted mainly to advising and training. 39 In addition, the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, as the regional security stabilizes, can be interpreted as the transition from joint policing to indirect policing in our language. The subsequent re-deployment of the U.S. Air Force to counter the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria can also be seen as the transition in reverse. It is not very meaningful to ask when the transition is complete. It is rather a matter of the degree of balance between direct and indirect policing.
Reciprocal Policing
If Perpetrators are dispersed across several states, international cooperation is essential to police them, because every state has severe legal, physical, and economic constraints in fighting abroad. It thus makes sense that these states establish a mechanism of reciprocal policing to enhance security. As a state joins the mechanism, it is liable for protecting other states from transnational perpetration originating from its own domain, while being protected by other states elsewhere. Namely, each state assumes the roles of Defender as well as Proxy. As our model suggests, this mechanism can work if a defecting state is subject to exclusion or other forms of penalty (Proposition 2). An instance of reciprocal policing is the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which mandates all the member states to establish legal and 38 Japan's shogunate had originally refused China's requests during its civil strife. It initiated a piracy expedition only after the shogunate achieved its political reunification, suggesting that Proxy's local influence is one of the critical determinants in shaping the form of policing (So 2004: 3-4 ). China's diplomacy ultimately worked (Tanaka 2012: 76) . 39 In Yemen, the U.S. adopted indirect measures as well as direct ones (Scahill 2013: 65, 234-236, 322, 386) . Even in Somalia, the U.S. aided the government that failed long ago (Scahill 2013: 476 (Shanglin 2006) . 43 To date, CWLT remains hypothetical but is an apparent application of our reciprocal policing to fighting cyber-crimes. According to Clarke and Knake (2010: 270) , "Non-state actors will be a problem for cyber arms control, but CWLT should shift the burden of stopping them to the states party to the convention. Nations would be required to rigorously monitor for hacking originating in their country and to prevent hacking activity from inside their territory. 
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With an eye to associated historical and contemporary incidents, we offer taxonomy of policing in four forms (Table 3) Reverting to the question of when indirect policing outperforms its direct counterpart, we maintain that the relative success of indirect policing hinges on which advantages or disadvantages are critical in its operation. The pros and cons of each counter-perpetration policy should be examined when policymakers adopt one out of alternatives. Policymaking must depend on how perpetrators' characteristics impede policing and how these impediments can be overcome.
As we have shown, transnational policing is far from rare in history but has been largely overlooked. We shed light on its mechanism and build a formal theory for it upon empirical grounds. With the rise of transnational perpetrators-a trend that, we believe, is very likely to continue in the future-transnational policing should be theoretically more refined, empirically more scrutinized, and perhaps practically more institutionalized. 
